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relied on. The difficulties of a perjury prosecution against the turncoat witness who suddenly developes a convenient loss of memory are
obvious. Perhaps a better result is found in those decisions which
allow the introduction of prior inconsistent or contradictory statements
to impeach the calling party's own witness where the party is
actually surprised by the turncoat statement. Such an approach was
examined at length in Young v. United States.15 The test of actual
prejudicial surprise would seem to be a more workable rule than any
artificial distinction between negative and affirmative statements. It
would appear that the merely negative statement, where it is actually
surprising to the calling party, may be as devastating as any positive
16
assertion.
Conclusion
The present case epitomizes the Kentucky rule as to impeachment
of a party's own witness on the grounds of prior inconsistent statements. The cases dating back for almost a .century draw a clear line
of departure between the impeachibility of affirmative and negative
statements by such a witness. It is suggested that the adoption of a
rule which would allow the calling party to impeach his own witness
by proof of prior contradictory statements where the party was
actually surprised, without regard for the negative or affirmative
quality of the witness's present testimony, would better provide both
an adequate protection for the nerves of prosecutors and an adequate
check against the unwarranted introduction of hearsay testimony.
Donald D. Harkins
LEGAL ETIcs-DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGs-CONVICION FOR WILLFUL
EvAsIoN OR AvoiANcE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES As GRouNDs.-Sub-

sequent to the conviction of an attorney in the United States District
Court of willfully and knowingly failing to make his federal income
tax return for 1952 in violation of federal law,' the Kentucky State
Bar Association brought disbarment proceedings. The attorney con15 97 F. 2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938). It was the factual disposition of this case
that the calling party had not in fact been surprised, and was, indeed, using the
turncoat witness as an artifice to introduce irrelevant and hearsay evidence. For
this reason impeachment was not allowed.
16 The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Model Drug Co. v. Patton, 208 Ky. 112,
270 S.W. 998 (1925) allowed impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent statements of the witness where the party calling him was surprised. The rule there
used was not defined, but the statements of the turncoat witness on the stand were
affirmative and prejudicial. Maddox v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 685, 225 S.W. 2d
107 (1949) which held that actual surprise of the calling party was not enough to
allow impeachment by prior contradictory statements where the statements of
the witness on the stand were not prejudicial or affirmative.
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 see. 7201.
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tended, among other things, that the offense of which he was convicted involved no moral turpitude. Held: Attorney not disbarred.
The court concluded that a conviction under the federal income tax
statute was not sufficient ground upon which to disbar him. Kentucky
State Bar Association v. McAfee, 301 S.W. 2d 899 (Ky. 1957).
The problem presented is whether the conviction of an attorney of
willfully evading or avoiding federal taxes is sufficient ground for disbarment, and this requires consideration of the question whether conduct which results in such conviction necessarily involves moral
turpitude.
Since this was a case of first impression before the cou, outside
sources of authority were considered. As its main authority the court relied on In re Hallinan,2 wherein the Supreme Court of California said:
Although the problem of defining moral turpitude is not without difficulty . . . it is settled that whatever else it may mean, it includes
fraud and that . . . a crime in which an intent to defraud is an
essential element is a crime involving moral turpitude... .3

The California Court held that an intention to defraud the United
States government is not an essential element in the offense of willfully

failing to pay taxes. Thus, a conviction under the above tax statute
does not involve moral turpitude per se.
In a later review of the Hallinancase,4 the Supreme Court of California adhered to its prior statement of the law, but it sustained the
subsequent finding of the Board of Governors that the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which petitioner
was convicted involved moral turpitude.5 If the latter holding of the
court is sound, then the Kentucky Court in the McAfee case is to be

critized for considering only the conviction and not the circumstances
surrounding it. A determination of the soundness of the California

Court's holding involves a short review of the relevant law and court
holdings.
As preliminary matter, it should be noted that the purpose of
disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but rather "to
preserve the courts from the ministration of persons unfit to serve therein as attorneys."0 In futherance of this idea, courts have said that
dereliction of an attorney in his personal capacity which involves moral
turpitude may be made the basis of disciplinary proceedings. 7
243 Cal. 2d 243, 272 P. 2d 768 (1954).
3Id. 272 P. 2d at 771.
448 Cal. 2d 52, 307 P. 2d 1 (1957).
5Mr. Hallinan had failed to record or report his cash fees for the express
purpose of evading income taxes.
7 Inre Burrus, 364 Mo. 22, 258 S.W. 2d 625, 627 (1953).
Bryant v. State Bar of California, 21 Cal. 2d 285, 131 P. 2d 523 (1942);
Matter of Moon, 310 S.W. 2d 935 (Mo. 1958).
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As Judge Cardozo has said:
ET]he charlatan and rogue may assume to heal the sick. The knave
and criminal may pose as a minister of justice. Such things cannot
have been intended, and will not be allowed.8

The majority of courts have adhered to the rule followed in the
Hallinancase,9 that a conviction under the federal tax statute does not
per se involve moral turpitude as grounds for disbarment.10 The primary consideration of the courts has been whether the element of
fraud was involved in the violation itself regardless of the facts and
circumstances. A minority of courts have found that it was, and have
held that a conviction was sufficient for disbarment on the ground of
moral turpitude. 1
Several courts have concluded that if the indictment charges a

willful evasion of taxes under the federal tax statute by fraudulently
and falsely failing to pay taxes, the fraud element exists and that such

conviction involves moral turpitude as grounds for disbarment. 12 As to
this, the majority view has been well stated:
Whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude depends on its
description as set out in the statute defining it and upon the material
essentials in the indictment charging it. It certainly does not depend
upon unnecessary adjectives a zealous and over careful prosecutor
may have added in the indictment to the essentials required by law
nor upon the elequent, perhaps even lurid description of the offense
by the prosecutor to court or jury.13
Even if fraud were an essential element in a conviction for violation
of the tax statute, there is serious doubt whether this would necessarily
be the "fraud" required for purposes of disbarment. A different concept of "fraud" is tenable in each instance, and this might easily lead
a court to two different findings on the same set of facts. At any rate,
moral turpitude may exist apart from the fact that a statute has been
violated. It has been said:
[I]f the crime is one involving moral turpitude it is because the act
denounced by the statute grievously offends the moral code of mankind and would do so even in the absence of a prohibitive statute.
8

In re Rouse, 22 N.Y. 81, 99, 116 N.E. 782, 786 (1917).
9 Supra note 2.
10 United States v. Schartan, 285 U.S. 518 (1932); United States v. Carollo,
30 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Mo. 1939); McGregor v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 283, 148 P.
2d 865 (1944); In re Diesen, 178 Minn. 297, 215 N.W. 427, 217 N.W. 356
(1927); Matter of Moon, 310 S.W. 2d 985 (Mo. 1958).
11Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F. 2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957); Chanan Din Khan
v. Barber,
147 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
12 In re Seijas, 318 P. 2d 961 (Wash. 1958); Matter of Kindschi, 319 P. 2d
824 (Wash. 1958).
13 United States v. Carrollo, 30 F. Supp. 3, 7 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
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The moral code of mankind was not enacted and it cannot be amended
by legislatures. 14

In view of the above discussion, it would seem that the Kentucky
Court in the McAfee case followed the better reasoned cases in holding
that a conviction under the federal income tax statute for willfully
failing to make a federal income tax return did not involve moral
turpitude in disbarment proceedings. However, it appears that the
court erred in failing to consider that, though the minimum requirements for a conviction did not involve moral turpitude per se, the facts
and circumstances under which the conviction was obtained may have
involved moral turpitude. This short-sighted holding by the court,
which it followed in a later decision, 15 might permit a person convicted
for violation of the federal income tax laws under any circumstances
to continue the practice of law in Kentucky. On this basis, the holding
of the principle case is unsound in theory and in practice.
Wilbur D. Short

PLEADING-WHEN Is AN AcrioN COMMNCED?-On January 2, 1956,
plaintiff, a resident of Virginia, was injured in an automobile collision
in Kentucky involving defendant, a Kentucky resident. On December
31, 1956, plaintiff's attorney filed a complaint with the deputy clerk
of the United States District Court for the Edstern District of Kentucky.
The attorney submitted typed copies of the summons, along with the
complaint, and suggested to the clerk that she issue the summons that
day. However, the clerk did not issue the summons until January 3,
1957. Defendant interposed the statute of limitations as a defense,'
arguing that the cause of action did not accrue within one year next
before the commencement of the action since the Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure require the filing of a complaint and issuance of summons for the commencement of an action.2 Held: Since failure to
issue the summons was due solely to a matter over which the plaintiff
had no control, and since he had done everything humanly possible to
cause the summons to be issued, the cause of action was saved. Hagy
v. Allen, 153 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
14 Id. at 6.
15 Kentucky State Bar Association v. Brown, 302 S.W. 2d 834 (Ky. 1957).
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 413.140 (1959) provides that an action for an injury to
the person of the plaintiff shall be commenced within one year after the cause of
action2 accrued. '
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 3 (1953) provides: "A civil action
is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a
summons or warning order thereon in good faith."

